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SOVIET NEWS TREATMENT OF KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV MEETING

Since the announcement on 19 May that the President and Khrushchev would meet in Vienna on 3 and 4 June, Soviet propaganda has made the meeting a major topic of comment. The talks between the two leaders are generally portrayed as of great importance and a timely step which could contribute to the relaxation of tension. A keynote of propaganda is the standard theme that the US and the USSR, as the two great powers, bear a major responsibility for securing peace. In the only high-level comment thus far, First Deputy Premier Mikoyan remarked at a reception for a British Trade Fair delegation that the talks would be important even if confined to an exchange of views.

The Soviet press has avoided any direct editorial comment but has used quotations from the foreign press to convey a generally optimistic appraisal. The President's 22 May remarks to a group of Soviet journalists were reported in a favorable light in the Soviet press on 23 May. Moscow has attempted to create the impression that the meeting was dictated by US public disappointment with American foreign policy. In a widely broadcast commentary on 19 May, Moscow claimed that agreement on the meeting is a "sign that there are forces in the US" which are working for an improvement in Soviet-American relations and a relaxation of tension.

A broadcast to domestic audiences on 21 May states that "one would like to believe" that the United States under President Kennedy "merely swerved onto the senseless road" of the previous adminis-

tration and now has chosen the "correct road of peaceful solution of disputed problems." Although Moscow has reported that the meeting was arranged through diplomatic channels and an exchange of messages, Presidential Press Secretary Salinger is quoted by the Soviet press as saying that the US took the initiative in the President's letter of 22 February.

Soviet propagandists have carefully avoided predicting any outcome, but have suggested that further high-level meetings may be arranged. The New York Times is quoted for the view that although the talks would be of a limited nature, they could bring decisive results. Some Soviet broadcasts adopt a hopeful note by pointing out that there are no insurmountable obstacles to improving US-Soviet relations and that the USSR intends to "do everything to make the meeting a success."

American press reports from Geneva were also published in Moscow in support of the view that the meeting in Vienna could lead to diplomatic talks and a summit meeting on East-West questions. In this connection, an editorial in the Soviet weekly New Times speculated that the Vienna meeting could lead to further talks at the "highest level." An East German propagandist stated on 19 May that the meeting could be considered a success if it served as only a starting point for future negotiations.

Both Mikoyan and Soviet Ambassador Menshikov, however, evaded a reply to journalists' questions whether the USSR was planning for a series of meetings. Soviet diplomats in

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Geneva, nevertheless, have inspired press speculation that one result of the meeting could be an invitation to the President to visit the USSR.

Moscow has made no attempt to outline a specific agenda for the meeting and has echoed the initial announcement that the meeting would be an exchange of views rather than a negotiation. Some hint of the subjects which the bloc expects to be covered is contained in publication of foreign press reports speculating that the Vienna talks could "lift the nuclear-test-ban negotiations from the current impasse." A Hungarian broadcast states that the meeting might have a favorable effect on the negotiations over Laos in Geneva.

An East German broadcast on 19 May listed disarmament as the primary topic, in addition to Laos, Cuba, and the German question. An East German politburo member in a speech on 22 May also expressed hope that at the meeting President Kennedy would "recognize the need for a peace settlement with both German states." The West German press reports that in an interview a "well-informed Soviet official in New York described Berlin as the main subject for the talks in Vienna.

Peiping promptly reported the TASS announcement of the meeting but has made no comment thus far.

Background

Soviet interest in a high-level meeting with the US was evident before the inauguration last January. In December,

Soviet officials made it clear that Khrushchev desired an early meeting with the President, either bilaterally or in a conclave of the heads of government at the UN General Assembly. These overtures were supported by public statements from Khrushchev and Foreign Minister Gromyko expressing hope for an improvement in US-Soviet relations.

Soviet diplomats were also intent on determining in advance what gestures would be most conducive to promoting an early meeting, and the main purpose of the prompt release of the RB-47 crew members was to remove possible obstacles to a resumption of high-level negotiations. In mid-January both Khrushchev and presidium member Suslov reaffirmed the Soviet policy of maintaining contacts with Western leaders.

Although Moscow continued attempts to gain an invitation for Khrushchev to meet with the President during the UN General Assembly session, the Soviet leaders by late February had apparently concluded that this campaign had failed. When the idea of a meeting was raised by Ambassador Thompson in his conversation with Khrushchev on 9 March, however, Khrushchev was receptive. Although negotiations were suspended by the US because of developments over Laos and Cuba, Foreign Minister Gromyko revived the idea of a meeting when he called in Ambassador Thompson on 4 May. Subsequently, Khrushchev again raised the question of a meeting in his letter to the President of 12 May delivered by Ambassador Menshikov on 16 May.
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EAST GERMAN CAMPAIGN FOR RECOGNITION

East Germany has recently gained some further degree of de facto recognition in the Middle East, Africa, and Brazil. It has not yet, however, induced any country outside the Soviet bloc--except Yugoslavia--to risk West German retaliation by granting de jure recognition.

Closely following the announcement on 22 April that Ceylon had authorized an East German trade mission in Colombo, the UAR announced that it would permit the East German trade office in Damascus to assume consular status. This move preceded the opening of negotiations between the UAR and West Germany in Bonn concerning West German aid, notably on the Euphrates Dam project. When the West German ambassador in Cairo protested that Nasir had expressly promised in 1959 not to raise the Damascus office to consular status, the UAR presidential affairs minister denied that such a promise had been given and maintained that the move was "routine" and involved no change in the UAR's policy of granting formal recognition only to Bonn.

Although a West German Foreign Ministry official maintains that Nasir in fact gave such an assurance in 1959 and should have informed Bonn before breaking the agreement, he stated that there was little possibility of effective West German countermeasures. In the same year, the UAR had explained that the establishment of the East German Consulate General in Cairo did not constitute diplomatic recognition. Because a West German severance of diplomatic ties with Cairo would only lead to Nasir's recognition of the Ulbricht regime, Bonn will have to remain content with the UAR's explanation.

Bonn realizes, however, that its tacit acquiescence in the elevation of the Damascus mission may tempt Lebanon and Iraq to grant consular status to the East German trade missions in Beirut and Baghdad. It may, therefore, refuse to undertake any new aid commitments to the UAR. Cairo has announced that the UAR negotiator will not leave for Bonn as planned.

In West Africa, East Germany is attempting to establish a foothold in Mali, while continuing to extend its influence in Ghana and Guinea. Under a trade agreement announced on 19 April, East German officials are arriving to staff a trade mission in Bamako, the Mali capital, while two newspapermen have taken positions in the Mali Information Ministry, presumably under the technical assistance agreement signed earlier this year.

Mali's foreign minister told the West German ambassador that Bamako would not permit the trade mission to assume diplomatic prerogatives nor would Mali establish its own mission in East Berlin. The US Embassy in Bamako nevertheless reports that the East Germans, with the support of the Czech ambassador, who is dean of the diplomatic corps there, are making a determined effort to present their mission as a diplomatic establishment.

In Brazil, the Ulbricht regime is taking advantage of President Janio Quadros' intention of widening his contacts with bloc countries to urge a major expansion of East German - Brazilian trade, which last year totaled nearly \$20,000,000. The East Germans have relatively little to give Brazil in comparison with the aid that Bonn is presently

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considering--\$50,000,000 in a new aid fund plus about the same amount in guarantees for exports from West Germany. The East Germans, however, will play up their increased contacts with Brazilian officials as de facto recognition; if Quadros goes through with his announced intention of inviting a high East German official to Brasilia, the East Germans would consider they had scored a triumph.

Bonn, seriously concerned, hopes to induce Quadros not to permit such a visit. The Brazilian ambassador in Bonn reported on 13 May that the West German Foreign Ministry told him that the reference to the "German Democratic Republic" in the invitation comes close to de facto recognition of the Ulbricht regime, calling attention to Bonn's break with Yugoslavia when Belgrade recognized East Germany in 1957. The West Germans also have attempted to persuade Quadros to cancel a visit to East Germany by Bra-

zil's roving ambassador, Joao Dantas, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Quadros had emphasized, however, that the visit is to be made in a "strictly personal capacity."

East Germany, with the founding of the Bamako mission, now has 30 trade missions in nonbloc countries. Those in Cairo, Djakarta, and Rangoon have been recognized as consulates general by the host countries but with diplomatic recognition expressly withheld. In addition, it has agreements for missions in Ceylon and Cambodia and reportedly is angling for offices in Tunisia and Morocco. At least eight of these missions--those in NATO countries and Sweden--represent the East German Chamber of Foreign Trade, ostensibly a nongovernment organization; the others represent the East German Foreign Trade Ministry, but are recognized as technical, not diplomatic, establishments. (TOP SECRET [REDACTED])

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